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RESUMEN
Los mecanismos de cooperación, basados en confianza, presentan dependencia de sus condiciones iniciales. Se ha 
probado que es posible promover y mantener la cooperación a través de la combinación de mecanismos usando un 
modelo de simulación sobre la crisis del CO2. Los resultados sugieren que la cooperación puede ser promovida y 
sustentada con la combinación de estos mecanismos. Los experimentos de simulación ofrecen soporte  a la hipótesis 
de que es posible  administrar la cooperación en dilemas sociales de gran escala incluso si las condiciones iniciales 
de confianza no son suficientes para esperar altos niveles de acción colectiva.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Gestión de la cooperación, Dilemas sociales a gran escala, Mecanismos, Confianza, 
Dependencia de las condiciones iniciales.
ABSTRACT
The mechanism of cooperation based on trust presents dependence to its initial conditions. We tested the possibility 
to promote and sustain cooperation through a combination of mechanisms using a simulation model in the CO2 
crisis. Our results suggest cooperation can be promoted and sustained with our combination of mechanisms. The 
simulation experiments offer support to our hypothesis about the possibility to manage cooperation in large-scale 
social dilemmas even if the trust’s initial conditions are not enough to expect high levels of collective action. 
KEYWORDS: Management of cooperation, Large-scale social dilemmas, Mechanisms, Trust, Dependence to 
initial conditions.
1. INTRODUCTION 
Cooperation is an alternative feasible to face small-scale 
social dilemmas (Ostrom et al., 2005); (Ostrom, 2002); 
(Ostrom et al., 2000). In laboratory (Ostrom et al., 1994). 
And field (Ostrom et al., 2005). Settings, cooperation is 
promoted and sustained using a mechanism based on 
trust (Ostrom et al., 2000). A dynamic version of the 
mechanism based on trust is presented on Figure 1. 
In this mechanism, trust promotes reciprocity. Later, 
reputation is affected by reciprocity. More reciprocity 
produces more in reputation and increases cooperation. 
Finally, reputation improves trust. In terms of dynamics, 
the initial conditions for trust affects the performance 
of cooperation because this core variables (trust, 
reputation, and cooperation) are joined in a reinforcing 
feedback loop that reinforce any initial condition. The 
literature reports this condition in models which present 
this feedback loop (Castillo et al., 2005). 
For example, we can assume the problem of making 
saving in energy consumption as a social dilemma. In 
this case, we can see the conflict between individual 
rationality represented by temptation to free ride and 
the group rationality.
Figure 1. Dynamic mechanism of cooperation based in trust. 
This is our dynamic interpretation based in (Ostrom, 2000) 
and (Castillo, et al, 2005)
More electricity is saved if the group develops trust. 
This mechanism, presented in Figure 2, shows us the 
dependence of the initial conditions which define the 
performance of trust in this situation as presented in 
Figure 3. 
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Figure 2. Mechanism of cooperation based on trust for 
electricity savings
This mechanism is represented using the following 
differential equations: 
This mechanism of cooperation based on trust exhibits 
dependence to initial conditions (Castillo, et al., 2005). 
As is presented in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Dependence to initial conditions for trust. This 
sensitivity analysis presents confidence zones for mechanism 
of cooperation based in Trust in a model for cooperation in 
energy provision for households 
Figure 3 presents how initial conditions drive behavior 
of trust. We performed a sensitivity analysis for initial 
conditions of trust. This analysis consisted in 200 
simulations using initial trust between 0 and 10 based 
in the uniform probability distribution. Figure 3 shows 
how initial conditions for trust affect the behavior 
of trust because this mechanism is conformed by a 
reinforce feedback loop. To be effective, cooperation 
requires a minimum value for initial trust. 
This is a problem for managers because they are not 
able to assure the effectiveness of this cooperation 
mechanism if it is applied for facing social dilemmas. 
If trust is depending of its initial conditions, this 
mechanism could be insufficient to promote, assure and 
sustain cooperation for all possible initial conditions. 
Additionally, there is not an agreement about the 
possibility to apply cooperation based on trust in large-
scale social situations (McGinnis et al., 2008). Or not 
(Biel et al., 1999). The mechanism of cooperation 
based on trust was developed to meet and work for the 
conditions of small-scale social dilemmas. However, we 
have found cooperation based on trust combined with 
other cooperation mechanisms could explain how people 
solve large scale social dilemas such as the Colombian 
electricity crisis and the Californean electricity crisis 
(incluir citaciones). This alternative way is a possible 
option which can be used by institutional designers to 
solve large scale social dilemmas like Climate Change. 
In this paper we propose an alternative for using 
cooperation based on trust as a core of a construct, a 
configuration as a unity of mechanisms crafted to 
achieve a social goal, which solve the dificulties its 
difficulties through additional mechanisms so we claim 
is  possible to manage cooperation in large-scale social 
dilemmas using additional mechanisms combined with 
cooperation based on trust to face the dependence to 
initial conditions. To test this claim, we developed a 
simulation model to the CO2 crisis. We use a particular 
structure of combined mechanisms to test if cooperation 
can be promoted and sustained even with zero as initial 
condition to trust. 
1.1 CO2 Crisis
Most documented explanation about Climate Change 
claims that the greenhouse effect has high influence 
on temperature (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change-IPCC. 2007). The atmosphere keeps some 
heat according to the effect of green house gases like 
CO2, that has been increased as a consequence of 
industrial activity mainly (Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change-IPCC. 2007). As global shared 
resource, climate is vulnerable to social dilemmas 
because individuals and nations can benefit in the 
short run from greenhouses emissions, while all of us 
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pay the price (Ostrom et al.,2002); (Buck, 1998). To 
reduce the concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs), 
emissions must fall below the rate at which GHGs are 
removed from the atmosphere. However, people do 
not understand the dynamics of the climate change 
(Sterman, 2002). Figure 4 shows data for CO2 measured 
at Manua Loa, Hawaii (Tans, 2010).  This behavior is 
explained as a consequence of the accumulation of CO2 
in the atmosphere and this occurs because emissions are 
higher than the ability of the system to capture CO2.
Figure 4. CO2 Data measured at Manua Loa, Hawaii (Tans, 
2010)
This paper presents an analisys based on the design 
and test of a construct to assure effective cooperation 
for facing CO2 crisis. We develop a simulation model 
which integrates a representation of accumulation of 
CO2 in the atmosphere and how the construct could 
reduce the accumulation of CO2. 
2. METHOD
The steps we followed to develop the construct and 
model the case were:
• To develop a dynamic hypothesis that explains how 
mechanisms can promote and sustain cooperation. 
• To model the CO2 crisis as a large-scale social 
dilemma.
• To simulate experiments to test the effectiveness of 
mechanisms to promote and sustain cooperation. 
We use System Dynamics guidelines (Sterman, 2000); 
(Forrster, 1961) to develop our construct as a dynamic 
hypothesis, to apply it for modeling the concentration of 
CO2 in the atmosphere and the effect of the mechanisms 
for promoting cooperation, assuming the situation as a 
social dilemma. We developed the model using Vensim 
5.7 for Windows emulated in Ubuntu 10.04 through 
Wine emulator. 
There are other methods which could be useful for 
studying the problem. Agent based models, and 
experimental economics. Agent based modeling is not 
useful if we want to explain how a mechanism actually 
solve a social dilemma. Experimental economics is not 
applicable because the characteristics of large-scale 
social dilemmas. In large-scale social dilemmas people 
are distributed around the entire entire planet. They do 
not have the opportunity to meet face to face around 
the resource and this is essential in order to perform a 
simulation experiment. Consequently, System dynamics 
allow us to perform simulation experiments to test the 
mechanisms. We can represent the rules people use 
to decide how much emissions they want to do. As a 
result, we can use the model to evaluate the effect of 
all actions of people around the atmosphere as a share 
resource. Finally we can represent all the delays in the 
information about the state of the shared resource. 
3. RESULTS
Initially, we present the construct that define our claim 
about how cooperation mechanisms can promote 
cooperation in large scale social dilemmas. Then, we 
explain a model that represents the CO2 crisis. Later 
we present simulation experiments that support our 
dynamic hypothesis. 
3.1 Construct
We assume a construct as a structure that combined 
mechanisms to promote a social objective (Elster, 
1989); (Maskin, 2008). Our construct integrates three 
mechanisms: cooperation based on trust, cooperation as 
norm, and cooperation as perception of damage. Figure 
5 presents the mechanism of cooperation based on trust. 
This mechanism is defined by a reinforcing feedback 
loop as explained before. This means every change 
in a variable present in this kind of feedback loop is 
reinforced. This feedback loop presents dependence to 
initial conditions and path dependence. An increase in 
the value of trust about resource management promotes 
cooperation in resource management therefore achieving 
a sustainable use of the resource. This feedback loop is 
based on (Ostrom, 2000). 
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Figure 5. Mechanism of cooperation based on trust as a 
component of the proposed construct 
Figure 6 presents the mechanism of cooperation based 
on trust integrated with the mechanism of cooperation 
as norm. This part of the construct suggests that people 
can learn to cooperate in long term because they 
cooperate in the short term. An increase in cooperative 
actions promotes learning about resource management 
that improves the resource’s sustainability. This 
learning allows us to assume cooperation as a norm. 
This mechanism is inspired in (Biel et al., 1999).
Figure 6.  Mechanism of cooperation as norm with 
cooperation based on trust 
Figure 7 presents the mechanism of cooperation as 
perception of damage incorporated to the construct. 
A reduction of the sustainable resource management 
promotes an expectancy of scarcity that increases the 
resource sustainable management. This mechanism 
consists of a balance feedback loop. This means a change 
in a variable of the feedback loop is compensated. This 
mechanism is inspired in (Schelling, 1958). 
Figure 7. Mechanism of cooperation by perception of damage
Figure 8 presents the construct as a united configuration 
of mechanisms to promote and sustain cooperation in 
large scale social dilemmas. This construct is based 
in general structure proposed by (Parra, 2010). All 
mechanisms allow community members to face the 
temptation to free ride. Free riding is represented with a 
feedback loop of balance. An increase in the availability 
of the resource produces free riding that feeds back 
decreasing the resource sustainable management. Our 
construct suggests a configuration of mechanisms able 
to face social dilemmas by effective cooperation. Next, 
we present the model developed to test the ability of 
these mechanisms to promote cooperation in the CO2 
crisis. 
Figure 8. Free riding and mechanisms of cooperation 
We proposed our Dynamic Hypothesis as an expression 
of the mechanism for cooperation for large scale 
resource social dilemmas. In Figure 9 we claim that 
only people will recognize a threat of damage about 
climate and the emissions on GHGs if they find a strong 
relationship between the emissions of GHGs and the 
effects of global warming as the extreme events. Only 
this recognition will produce enough pressure to reduce 
the emissions.
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Figure 9. Dynamic Hypothesis about how cooperation could 
contribute to reduce CO2 concentration in atmosphere 
3.2 The Simulation Model
We developed a simulation model to test the proposed 
mechanism. The model is a system of differential 
equations. The general structure of the model is 
presented in Figure 10. This structure is formed by each 
mechanism. 
We present each particular structure for the specific 
mechanism. Figure 11 presents the stocks and flows 
diagram for recognition of danger. The recognition of 
danger is accumulated by the awareness of an increase 
in the concentration of CO2. This recognition suffers 
depreciation because its defined lifetime . More lifetime 
better to sustain cooperation with this mechanism.
 Figure 10. General structure for the model
Figure 12 presents the structure for temptation to free 
ride. If the concentration of CO2 is reduced then this 
accumulates temptation to free ride. This accumulation 
is depleted by a lifetime. More lifetime increases the 
emission of CO2 because of the temptation to free ride. 
Figure 13 presents the structure to trust. Cooperation 
is measured by the improvements in the reduction of 
CO2 concentration. This perception is accumulated 
in the differential equation to trust. Trust is depleted 
according to a lifetime. More lifetime sustains trust for 
a longer period of time. 
Figure 11. Model’s structure for perception of danger Figure 12. Model’s structure for temptation of free riding
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Figure 13. Model’s structure for trust
Figure 14 presents the structure for CO2 concentration. 
We suppose emissions are accumulated in the 
atmosphere. Due to nature’s process, CO2 is capture C 
according to a lifetime. 
Figure 14. Model’s structure for 2 basic dynamics
More lifetime supposes more climate change effects.
These are the differential equations which define the 
model. 
3.3 Simulation Experiments
We set the value for social objective in 315 p.p.m.v. 
for 2 in the atmosphere. We assume the concentration 
of CO2 for 2010 as an initial value for the simulation. 
We test if the mechanisms of the construct are able to 
promote and sustain cooperation in order to achieve 
the social objective proposed. The simulation results 
support our dynamic hypothesis. 
Some important variables used in this scenario with 
their initial values are presented in Table 1.  
Table 1. Some important variables used in this scenario with 
their initial values
Variable Initial value (t=0)
Delay to perceive trend 
cooperation 5 years
Average trust life time 5 years
CO2 average lifetime in the 
atmosphere 7 years
Average life time 
depretiation recognition 
danger
5 years
Adjustment time increasing 
recognition danger 2 years
Average life time free 
riding: 10 years
Life time positive 
experience 10 years
Figure 15 presents the results for the simulation 
experiment defined by the initial conditions. As we 
can see, CO2 can be controlled with the combination of 
mechanisms used. 
Figure 15. Simulated behavior for CO2 under a treatment 
based of mechanisms for promoting cooperation in red. In 
blue CO2 data by (Tans, 2010)
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Each mechanism has its zone of predominance. Figure 
16 shows the zone of predominance for cooperation as 
perception of damage. This controls the exponential 
growth for CO2. This mechanism allows to promote 
cooperation even if the initial condition for trust is zero. 
This assures enough initial trust to feed the cooperation 
based on trust.
Figure 16. Simulated behavior for CO2 under a treatment 
based of mechanisms for promoting cooperation and the 
predominance for cooperation as perception of damage in 
red. In blue CO2 data by(Tans, 2010)
Figure 17 presents the zone of predominance for 
cooperation based on trust. This kind of cooperation, 
that will be learned as a norm, will allow to achieve the 
goal of 315 p.p.m.v. for CO2 in the atmosphere as social 
objective.
Figure 17. Simulated behavior for CO2 under a treatment 
based of mechanisms for promoting cooperation and 
the predominance for cooperation based on trust in red. 
In blue CO2 data by (Tans, 2010) 
Figure 18 presents how cooperation as norm controls 
CO2 in the long run. 
Figure 18. Simulated behavior for CO2 under a treatment 
based of mechanisms for promoting cooperation and the 
predominance for cooperation as norm in red. In blue CO2 
data by (Tans, 2010) 
3.4  Sensitivity Analysis
We performed sensitivity analysis to test if small changes 
in the average life time for cooperation as perception of 
damage can produces more than proportional changes in 
cooperation. We made 200 simulations for 5 to 33 years 
for life time in cooperation as perception of damage. 
Figure 19 presents the dynamic confidence bounds for 
the sensitivity analysis for CO2. Higher the value for 
life time in cooperation as perception of damage, better 
reduction for CO2. 
Figure 19. Sensitivity analysis for cooperation as perception 
of damage
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4. DISCUSSION 
We presented a construct as a dynamic hypothesis that 
explains how mechanisms are combined to promote 
cooperation in the CO2 crisis assumed as a large-scale 
social dilemma. The dynamic version of the Ostrom’s 
mechanism of cooperation based on trust (Ostrom, 
2000)  for large-scale social dilemmas that we suggested 
worked under the conditions of this kind of social 
dilemmas. We explained how the dependence for trust’s 
initial conditions in the mechanism of cooperation 
based on trust proposed by (Ostrom, 2010) is controlled 
with our construct. We applied System Dynamics 
guidelines to develop the model and test the construct 
(Parra, 2010). 
(Castillo et al., 2005). Offered a behavioral model that 
explains cooperation in data from a field experiment 
in a small-scale situation. That model used only the 
mechanism of cooperation based on trust. Our model 
combines as unit three mechanisms to assure an effective 
and sustainable cooperation even in non existing initial 
conditions for trust in a large scale situation like the 
CO2 crisis.
Our work suggests how cooperation can be effective 
to face social dilemmas like CO2 crisis. This supposes 
a new alternative to face this crisis. This alternative 
could be tested and combined with other designs to face 
CO2 crisis like green certificates (Morthorst, 2000) and 
emissions permits (Jensen et al., 2000). 
Cooperation is a possible option even in large-scale 
social situations. Previous contributions suggested the 
possibility to extend the mechanism based on trust for 
applying in large-scale situations (McGinnis, et al., 
2008) but not using a combination of mechanisms. 
In the case of CO2 crisis we recognize limitations for 
our construct to be considered. Dynamic complexity, 
understood as the effect of delays in information about 
the state of the shared resource and the effect of others 
cooperation is critical in the success of cooperation. 
This problem could be linked with the work about 
difficulties for people to make high quality decisions 
in situations of high inertia and delays (Sterman et al., 
2007); (Diehl et al., 1995); (Sterman, 1989). Our results 
suggest a new application of dynamic complexity 
studies for large-scale social dilemmas like CO2 crisis.
5. CONCLUSION
We presented how cooperation can be promoted and 
sustained even with zero initial trust. Our construct 
offered an explanation about how mechanisms for 
cooperating are able assure effective cooperation in a 
large scale situation. 
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9. APPENDIX
Simulation model equations.
accumulated recognition of danger= INTEG (
 increasing-depretiation,
 init accumulated recognition of danger)
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
adjustment time implementation delay=
 20
 ~ Year
 ~  |
adjustment time increasing recognition danger=
 2
 ~ Year
 ~  |
aprox rate growth=
 IF THEN ELSE( restriction co2 emissions time series(Time)>0 ,0, initial rate growth*\
 fraction increase co2 by free riding)
 ~ Dmnl/Year [0,1,0.0005]
 ~ 0.1465
 |
average life time depretiation recognition danger=
 5
 ~ Year [1,40]
 ~  |
average life time free riding=
 10
 ~ Year [1,60]
 ~  |
average time recog trend co2=
 10
 ~ Year
 ~  |
average trust life time=
 5
 ~ Year
 ~  |
co2 accounts= INTEG (
 inflow accounts-outflow accounts,
  CO2 ppmv)
 ~ co2 ppmv
 ~  |
co2 emissions per capita time series(
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 [(0,0) - (0,10)],(1980,4.16),(1981,4.04),(1982,3.95),(1983,3.91),(1984,4.03),(1985,4.05\
  ),(1986,4.08),(1987,4.11),(1988,4.17),(1989,4.16),(1990,4.11),(1991,4.03),(1992,3.96\
  ),(1993,3.94),(1994,3.92),(1995,3.92),(1996,3.96),(1997,3.98),(1998,3.92),(1999,3.93\
  ),(2000,3.96),(2001,3.95),(2002,3.99),(2003,4.14),(2004,4.31),(2005,4.42),(2006,4.48\
  ))
 ~ Metric Tons of Carbon Dioxide/(people*Year)
 ~  |
co2 goal= INITIAL(
 315.98)
 ~ co2 ppmv
 ~ 315.98 year 1958
 |
co2 max danger level=
 400
 ~ co2 ppmv [0,2000,1]
 ~  |
CO2 ppmv
 ~ co2 ppmv
 ~  |
decreasing cooperation learning=
 positive experiences of cooperation/life time positive experiences
 ~ Dmnl/Year
 ~  |
decreasing temptation to free riding=
 temptation to free riding/average life time free riding
 ~ Dmnl/Year
 ~  |
decreasing trust=
 trust/average trust life time
 ~ Dmnl/Year
 ~  |
delay to perceive trend cooperation=
 5
 ~ Year
 ~  |
depretiation=
 accumulated recognition of danger/average life time depretiation recognition danger
 ~ Dmnl/Year
 ~  |
fraction increase co2 by free riding=
 relationship free riding fraction increase co2(relative temptation to free ride)
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
fraction reduced by long term cooperation learned=
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 relation positive experiences and reduction(relative long term cooperation)
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
growth rate co2 time series(
 [(1959,0) - (2100,3)],(1959,0.95),(1960,0.51),(1961,0.95),(1962,0.69),(1963,0.73),(1964\
  ,0.29),(1965,0.98),(1966,1.23),(1967,0.75),(1968,1.02),(1969,1.34),(1970,1.02),(1971\
  ,0.82),(1972,1.76),(1973,1.18),(1974,0.78),(1975,1.1),(1976,0.91),(1977,2.09),(1978\
  ,1.31),(1979,1.68),(1980,1.8),(1981,1.43),(1982,0.72),(1983,2.16),(1984,1.37),(1985\
  ,1.24),(1986,1.51),(1987,2.33),(1988,2.09),(1989,1.27),(1990,1.31),(1991,1.02),(1992\
  ,0.43),(1993,1.35),(1994,1.9),(1995,1.98),(1996,1.19),(1997,1.96),(1998,2.93),(1999\
  ,0.94),(2000,1.74),(2001,1.59),(2002,2.56),(2003,2.29),(2004,1.56),(2005,2.55),(2006\
  ,1.69),(2007,2.17),(2008,1.66),(2009,1.66),(2010,1.66),(2011,1.66))
 ~ co2 ppmv/Year
 ~  |
implementation delay= 
 DELAY N((reduction by danger+reduction by cooperation+(1-fraction reduced by long term cooperation 
learned\
  )), adjustment time implementation delay , 0,3 )
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
increasing=
 (recognition co2 danger+restriction co2 emissions time series(Time))/adjustment time increasing recognition 
danger
 ~ Dmnl/Year
 ~  |
increasing cooperation learning=
 MAX( perceived trend cooperation , 0 )*relative recognition of danger
 ~ Dmnl/Year
 ~ IF THEN ELSE(relationship trend cooperation learning(perceived trend \
  cooperation):AND:relationship relative recognition of danger cooperation \
  learning
  >1, 1 , 
  0)
 |
increasing temptation to free ride=
 relationship trend co2 free ride(trend co2)
 ~ Dmnl/Year
 ~ IF THEN ELSE(trend co2>0, 0 ,1 )
 |
increasing trust=
 IF THEN ELSE(perceived trend cooperation>0 :AND:relative recognition of danger>1 , 1\
   , 0 )
 ~ Dmnl/Year
 ~ :AND:restriction co2 emissions time series(Time)>0
 |
inflow accounts=
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 co2 accounts*(aprox rate growth-(aprox rate growth*implementation delay))
 ~ co2 ppmv/Year
 ~  |
init accumulated recognition of danger=
 0
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
init trust=
 0
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
initial co2 in at= INITIAL(
 CO2 ppmv)
 ~ co2 ppmv
 ~  |
initial co2 trend=
 0.01
 ~ 1/Year
 ~  |
initial positive experiences of cooperation=
 0
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
initial rate growth=
 0.1465
 ~ Dmnl/Year [0.1465,1,1e-005]
 ~  |
initial temptation to free ride=
 0
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
initial trend=
 0.01
 ~ 1/Year
 ~  |
life time=
 7
 ~ Year [0,500,1]
 ~  |
life time positive experiences=
 10
 ~ Year
 ~  |
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minimun danger required to reduction=
 1
 ~ Dmnl [0.1,20,0.01]
 ~  |
minimun learning required to promote reduction by cooperation=
 1
 ~ Dmnl [0.001,40,0.0001]
 ~  |
minimun temptation to reduce=
 0.1
 ~ Dmnl [0.1,5,0.01]
 ~  |
minimun trend cooperation to increase cooperation learning=
 0.8
 ~ 1/Year
 ~  |
minimun trust to reduce=
 1
 ~ Dmnl [0.1,6]
 ~  |
outflow accounts=
 co2 accounts/life time
 ~ co2 ppmv/Year
 ~  |
perceived trend cooperation=
 TREND( proxy cooperation , delay to perceive trend cooperation , initial trend)
 ~ 1/Year
 ~  |
portion reduction cooperation(
 [(0,0)-(6,0.1)],(0,0),(1,0),(2.78899,0.00964912),(4.0367,0.0390351),(4.73394,0.0710526\
  ),(5,0.1))
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
positive experiences of cooperation= INTEG (
 increasing cooperation learning-decreasing cooperation learning,
  initial positive experiences of cooperation)
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
proxy cooperation=
 co2 goal/co2 accounts
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
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recognition co2 danger=
 IF THEN ELSE( trend co2>0 :AND:co2 accounts>co2 max danger level, 1 , 0 )
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
reduction by cooperation=
 portion reduction cooperation(relative trust)
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
reduction by danger=
 relationship danger reduction(relative recognition of danger)
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
relation positive experiences and reduction(
 [(0,0.8)-(2,1)],(0,1),(0.654434,1.02193),(0.844037,0.922807),(0.978593,0.867544),(1.19878\
  ,0.831579),(1.52905,0.801754),(2,0.8))
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
relationship danger reduction(
 [(0,0)-(2,0.05)],(0,0),(1,0),(1.43119,0.00745614),(1.82263,0.0219298),(2,0.05))
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
relationship free riding fraction increase co2(
 [(0,1)-(3,1.1)],(0,1),(1,1),(1,1.03728),(1.05505,1.06272),(1.3211,1.08377),(1.81651,\
  1.09342),(3,1.1))
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
relationship relative recognition of danger cooperation learning=
 IF THEN ELSE(relative recognition of danger>1, 1, 0 )
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
relationship trend co2 free ride(
 [(-2,0)-(0,1)],(-2,1),(-0.715596,0.982456),(-0.428135,0.947368),(-0.238532,0.833333)\
  ,(-0.12844,0.587719),(0,0))
 ~ Dmnl/Year
 ~  |
relationship trend cooperation learning(
 [(-1,0)-(1,1)],(-1,0),(-0.9,0),(-0.8,0),(-0.0397554,0),(0.00917431,0.192982),(0.0165138\
  ,0.267544),(0.0568807,0.644737),(0.0642202,0.802632),(0.302752,0.969298),(1,1))
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
relative long term cooperation=
 positive experiences of cooperation/minimun learning required to promote reduction by cooperation
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
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relative recognition of danger=
 accumulated recognition of danger/minimun danger required to reduction
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
relative temptation to free ride=
 temptation to free riding/minimun temptation to reduce
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
relative trust=
 trust/minimun trust to reduce
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
restriction co2 emissions time series(
 [(1950,0)-(2100,1)],(1950,0),(2008,0),(2009,0),(2010,0),(2011,0),(2020,0),(2100,0))
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
temptation to free riding= INTEG (
 increasing temptation to free ride-decreasing temptation to free riding,
  initial temptation to free ride)
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
trend co2=
 TREND(co2 accounts, average time recog trend co2 , initial co2 trend)
 ~ 1/Year
 ~  |
trust= INTEG (
 increasing trust-decreasing trust,
  init trust)
 ~ Dmnl
 ~  |
********************************************************
 .Control
********************************************************~
  Simulation Control Parameters
 |
FINAL TIME  = 2150
 ~ Year
 ~ The final time for the simulation.
 |
INITIAL TIME  = 1958
 ~ Year
 ~ The initial time for the simulation.
 |
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SAVEPER  = 1
 ~ Year [0,?]
 ~ The frequency with which output is stored.
 |
TIME STEP  = 0.0625
 ~ Year [0,?]
 ~ The time step for the simulation.
 |
\\\---/// Sketch information - do not modify anything except names
V300  Do not put anything below this section - it will be ignored
*restriction
$192-192-192,0,Times New Roman|12||0-0-0|0-0-0|0-0-255|-1--1--1|-1--1--1|96,96,75,0
10,1,Time,325,397,26,11,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,2,co2 accounts,649,265,60,29,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
12,3,48,332,238,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,4,6,2,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(530,241)|
1,5,6,3,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(400,241)|
11,6,48,465,241,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,7,inflow accounts,465,260,49,11,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
12,8,48,925,247,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,9,11,8,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(856,247)|
1,10,11,2,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(747,247)|
11,11,48,792,247,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,12,outflow accounts,792,266,53,11,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,13,2,12,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(709,111)|
10,14,life time,945,124,25,11,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,15,14,12,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(873,190)|
10,16,aprox rate growth,340,362,56,11,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,17,16,7,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(396,315)|
1,18,2,7,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(526,107)|
10,19,CO2 ppmv,353,131,46,11,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,20,19,2,0,0,0,0,0,64,1,-1--1--1,,1|(476,186)|
10,21,co2 goal,929,548,28,11,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,22,proxy cooperation,791,377,58,11,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,23,2,22,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(725,325)|
1,24,21,22,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(864,467)|
10,25,restriction co2 emissions time series,128,420,46,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,26,25,16,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(229,392)|
10,27,Time,286,457,26,11,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,28,27,16,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(309,415)|
10,29,initial rate growth,119,343,54,11,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,30,29,16,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(221,351)|
10,31,reduction by cooperation,571,549,45,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,32,31,34,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(545,444)|
10,33,reduction by danger,739,508,45,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,34,implementation delay,516,326,48,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,35,adjustment time implementation delay,703,585,67,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,36,33,34,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(632,421)|
1,37,35,34,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(613,461)|
1,38,34,7,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(491,294)|
10,39,fraction increase co2 by free riding,190,269,71,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
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1,40,39,16,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(265,315)|
10,41,fraction reduced by long term cooperation 
learned,345,553,84,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,42,41,34,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(425,445)|
12,43,0,1611,290,337,195,3,188,0,0,1,0,0,0
cooperation_co2_model_vs
\\\---/// Sketch information - do not modify anything except names
V300  Do not put anything below this section - it will be ignored
*trust
$192-192-192,0,Times New Roman|12||0-0-0|0-0-0|0-0-255|-1--1--1|-1--1--1|96,96,75,0
10,1,trust,568,351,40,20,3,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
12,2,48,208,338,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,3,5,1,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(453,338)|
1,4,5,2,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(292,338)|
11,5,48,373,338,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,6,increasing trust,373,357,47,11,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
12,7,48,963,343,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,8,10,7,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(869,343)|
1,9,10,1,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(691,343)|
11,10,48,780,343,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,11,decreasing trust,780,362,49,11,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,12,1,11,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(660,169)|
10,13,average trust life time,880,468,52,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,14,13,11,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(831,416)|
10,15,proxy cooperation,205,222,43,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,16,perceived trend cooperation,361,289,50,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,17,15,16,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(275,252)|
1,18,16,6,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(366,320)|
10,19,delay to perceive trend cooperation,343,163,57,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,20,19,16,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(350,219)|
10,21,initial trend,481,187,35,11,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,22,21,16,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(431,229)|
10,23,init trust,485,249,26,11,8,3,1,0,0,0,0,0
10,24,relative trust,575,517,39,11,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,25,1,24,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(570,431)|
1,26,23,1,0,0,0,0,0,64,1,-1--1--1,,1|(517,290)|
10,27,portion reduction cooperation,328,624,55,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,28,reduction by cooperation,580,623,40,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,29,27,28,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(454,623)|
1,30,24,28,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(576,559)|
10,31,restriction co2 emissions time series,44,395,70,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,32,Time,393,467,26,11,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
12,33,6161240,1552,1046,343,194,3,188,0,0,1,0,0,0
cooperation_co2_model_vs
10,34,minimun trust to reduce,344,519,50,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,35,34,24,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(458,518)|
10,36,relative recognition of danger,330,439,65,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,37,36,6,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(349,400)|
\\\---/// Sketch information - do not modify anything except names
V300  Do not put anything below this section - it will be ignored
*expectation of unavailability
$192-192-192,0,Times New Roman|12||0-0-0|0-0-0|0-0-255|-1--1--1|-1--1--1|96,96,75,0
10,1,co2 accounts,327,51,51,11,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
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10,2,trend co2,398,214,31,11,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,3,recognition co2 danger,563,82,49,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,4,1,2,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(359,126)|
10,5,average time recog trend co2,244,265,60,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,6,5,2,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(327,237)|
10,7,initial co2 trend,376,353,48,11,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,8,7,2,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(385,290)|
10,9,co2 max danger level,405,-9,52,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,10,2,3,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(469,156)|
1,11,9,3,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(477,33)|
1,12,1,3,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(439,65)|
10,13,restriction co2 emissions time series,669,-18,70,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,14,Time,566,266,26,11,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,15,accumulated recognition of danger,912,178,126,35,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
12,16,48,541,166,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,17,19,15,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(730,166)|
1,18,19,16,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(606,166)|
11,19,48,668,166,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,20,increasing,668,185,32,11,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
12,21,48,1415,173,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,22,24,21,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1316,173)|
1,23,24,15,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1126,173)|
11,24,48,1221,173,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,25,depretiation,1221,192,38,11,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
10,26,average life time depretiation recognition danger,1359,47,74,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,27,26,25,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1286,122)|
1,28,15,25,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1039,-50)|
1,29,3,20,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(614,132)|
1,30,13,20,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(668,80)|
1,31,14,20,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(610,229)|
10,32,adjustment time increasing recognition danger,812,41,68,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,33,32,20,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(736,116)|
10,34,relative recognition of danger,916,299,60,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,35,init accumulated recognition of danger,1054,51,67,19,8,3,1,0,0,0,0,0
1,36,35,15,0,0,0,0,0,64,1,-1--1--1,,1|(997,101)|
1,37,15,34,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(913,239)|
10,38,reduction by danger,1148,387,40,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,39,relationship danger reduction,1148,512,60,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,40,39,38,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1148,456)|
1,41,34,38,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1030,342)|
12,42,0,1270,908,333,191,3,188,0,0,1,0,0,0
cooperation_co2_model_vs
10,43,minimun danger required to reduction,775,467,67,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,44,43,34,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(840,388)|
\\\---/// Sketch information - do not modify anything except names
V300  Do not put anything below this section - it will be ignored
*free riding
$192-192-192,0,Times New Roman|12||0-0-0|0-0-0|0-0-255|-1--1--1|-1--1--1|96,96,75,0
10,1,temptation to free riding,570,140,58,27,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
12,2,48,269,134,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,3,5,1,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(456,134)|
1,4,5,2,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(334,134)|
11,5,48,395,134,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
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10,6,increasing temptation to free ride,395,161,67,19,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
12,7,48,1005,135,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,8,10,7,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(906,135)|
1,9,10,1,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(716,135)|
11,10,48,811,135,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,11,decreasing temptation to free riding,811,162,69,19,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,12,1,11,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(688,-66)|
10,13,average life time free riding,804,312,52,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,14,13,11,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(806,243)|
10,15,initial temptation to free ride,656,215,60,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,16,trend co2,227,26,40,11,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,17,16,6,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(300,85)|
10,18,relationship trend co2 free ride,387,-7,55,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,19,fraction increase co2 by free riding,567,414,66,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,20,relationship free riding fraction increase co2,333,412,70,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,21,20,19,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(445,412)|
1,22,1,25,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(563,214)|
1,23,15,1,0,0,0,0,0,64,1,-1--1--1,,1|(622,185)|
12,24,1900874,1490,654,330,167,3,188,0,0,1,0,0,0
cooperation_co2_model_vs
10,25,relative temptation to free ride,556,295,58,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,26,minimun temptation to reduce,341,282,61,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,27,26,25,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(442,287)|
1,28,25,19,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(560,347)|
1,29,18,6,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(390,70)|
\\\---/// Sketch information - do not modify anything except names
V300  Do not put anything below this section - it will be ignored
*long term cooperation learning
$192-192-192,0,Times New Roman|12||0-0-0|0-0-0|0-0-255|-1--1--1|-1--1--1|96,96,75,0
10,1,positive experiences of cooperation,772,312,94,50,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
12,2,48,208,299,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,3,5,1,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(566,299)|
1,4,5,2,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(330,299)|
11,5,48,448,299,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,6,increasing cooperation learning,448,326,65,19,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
12,7,48,1348,302,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,8,10,7,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1223,302)|
1,9,10,1,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(981,302)|
11,10,48,1102,302,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,11,decreasing cooperation learning,1102,329,65,19,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,12,1,11,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(933,20)|
10,13,life time positive experiences,1332,192,51,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,14,13,11,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1223,256)|
10,15,perceived trend cooperation,229,60,55,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,16,15,6,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(333,187)|
10,17,initial positive experiences of cooperation,156,360,46,28,8,3,1,0,0,0,0,0
1,18,17,1,0,0,0,0,0,64,1,-1--1--1,,1|(433,338)|
10,19,minimun learning required to promote reduction by cooperation,543,517,89,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,20,relative long term cooperation,787,513,55,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,21,1,20,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(779,421)|
1,22,19,20,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(675,514)|
10,23,fraction reduced by long term cooperation learned,786,684,80,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,24,relation positive experiences and reduction,516,680,52,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
28
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Adriana Rocío Lizcano-Dallos
1,25,24,23,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(630,680)|
1,26,20,23,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(786,591)|
12,27,3539222,1415,1049,368,189,3,188,0,0,1,0,0,0
cooperation_co2_model_vs
10,28,accumulated recognition of danger,422,82,72,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,29,relative recognition of danger,444,76,65,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,30,relationship relative recognition of danger cooperation learning,617,50,67,28,8,3,1,0,0,0,0,0
1,31,29,6,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(445,194)|
10,32,minimun trend cooperation to increase cooperation learning,152,449,84,28,8,3,1,0,0,0,0,0
10,33,relationship trend cooperation learning,149,204,65,19,8,3,1,0,0,0,0,0
10,34,relative recognition of danger,600,208,65,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,35,34,30,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(606,140)|
